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Mathematical Representations of “Excitement” in Games : A 
Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems ♦ 
 
Satoru KUMAGAI* 
 
Abstract 
 
Researchers have long believed the concept of “excitement” in games to be subjective 
and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically 
computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of an audience and 
from that of a player. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the 
probability of “winning” before and after one specific “play” in a given game. If the 
probability of winning becomes very positive or negative by that play, then the audience 
will feel the game to be “exciting.” The index makes a large contribution to the study of 
games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the “excitement” of various 
games. It may be applied in many fields, especially the area of welfare economics, and 
applications may range from those related to allocative efficiency to axioms of justice 
and equity. 
?????????????????????????
♦?This paper is the complete version of Kumagai (2007), which focused only on only the index 
of “excitement” in games from the viewpoint of an audience. 
??Researcher, Economic Integration Studies Group, Inter-Disciplinary Studies Center, IDE 
(kumagai@ide.go.jp)?
? ??
1. Introduction 
  
 Researchers have long believed the concept of “excitement” in games to be 
subjective and difficult to measure. It is true that “excitement” may differ significantly 
from person to person even though all are playing or watching the same game. The 
concept of “excitement” involves various factors such as having fun seeing or doing 
something fantastic or promoting a favorite sports team. 
 In this paper, “excitement” in games is refined through the development of a 
mathematically computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of the 
audience and then from that of the player. A key concept of the mathematical index is 
that the core element of “excitement” is the differential of the probability of “winning” 
before and after one specific “play” in a match1. If the probability of winning becomes 
very positive or very negative by that play, the audience feels the game to be “exciting.” 
However, this may not be the only measure of “excitement”, and the key concept may 
have problems. These problems and an alternative concept are explored later. The work 
presented here may provide a breakthrough in the development of an objective index of 
“excitement” from the viewpoint of a player, which may be the most important 
viewpoint from which to analyze the “excitement” of games. 
 This paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 contains a refinement of the 
concept of “excitement” for mathematical formulation. The first mathematical 
representation of “excitement” in games based on the above mentioned key concept is 
presented in Section 3. In Section 4, problems with the key concept are discussed, and 
?????????????????????????
? The author first considered this idea in 1997. A similar concept may be found at 
http://live.protrade.com/, but it is not clear who originally developed the idea. The concept of 
“excitement” in games may be the “folk theorem” of game theory.  
? ??
an alternative concept of “excitement” is proposed. Section 5 includes discussion of the 
difficulties in dealing with the concept of “excitement” from the viewpoint of a player. 
An index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of a rational player is then 
developed. Conclusions are presented in the final section.  
   
2. Refining the Concept of “Excitement” 
 
2.1 Two Factors of Excitement 
 Although there are various sources of “excitement” in games, such sources may 
be categorized into two groups: 
  The first group of sources includes doing something fun such as running, chasing 
after something, jumping, or shooting for example. This group contains both physical 
and virtual forms. For example, the “excitement” of shooting can be both physical 
(using real guns) and virtual (as in a computer game). Hereafter, this group of 
“excitement” will be termed the “fun factor”. 
 The second group of sources includes seeking success or winning the game. This 
group of “excitement” arises from a formal system of rules (termed a “game system”). 
The “excitement” of chess comes primarily from the game system of chess, not from 
physically moving a knight or a pawn. This source of “excitement” will be termed the 
“game system factor”. 
? ??
 In constructing an objective index of “excitement” in games, it is crucial to 
consider only the “game system factor”2. The “fun factor” is simply too subjective to be 
analyzed numerically.   
 
2.2 Two Viewpoints of Excitement 
 
  It is also useful to separate two viewpoints of “excitement” in games: the 
viewpoint of the “player” and that of the “audience.” The “excitement” of games from 
the viewpoint of the player is much more complex than that of the audience. So, this 
paper first concentrates on the latter and then proceeds to the former. Consider the 
following points: 
 First, players of a game put much effort into playing the game. Thus, the 
“excitement” of games from the viewpoint of the player might be well analyzed using a 
“cost-benefit” type of analysis. Conversely, audience “excitement” can be analyzed 
without considering audience “efforts” in watching the game.  
 Second, player “excitement” tends to contain more of the “fun factor” and may be 
more objective than audience “excitement”. For example, football can be exciting 
without any rules because kicking and chasing a ball is in itself “fun” and “exciting”. 
 Third, player “excitement” tends to be strongly influenced by the result of the 
game, that is, by who wins and who loses. An “exciting match” is “not exciting” at all 
for the loser. On the other hand, audience “excitement” tends to be more subjective and 
?????????????????????????
??Huizinga (1955) and Caillois (1961) both analyzed “play as fun”. However, little 
research had been conducted on this factor prior to that of Salen and Zimmerman 
(2004).?
? ??
“process oriented.” “Excitement” of a member of the audience who is a fanatic fan of a 
player or team can be quite different from that of others. Therefore, for purposes of this 
study, a hypothetical “neutral” audience that does not care about who wins (evaluates 
the process of the match as neutral) will be used as sole evaluator of “excitement” in 
games. 
    
3. “Excitement” of Games from the Viewpoint of a Neutral Audience 
 
 Figures 1 and 2 show the movement of the probability of winning for hypothetical 
baseball game scores seen in Tables 1 and 2. The probability of winning before the 
game is 0.5 because it is unknown which team will win, and both hypothetically have 
an equal chance of winning. After the game, the probability of winning for a team 
converges to 1 or 0 (the team has either won or lost). The probability of winning during 
the game moves with the score. 
 
 
Table 1: Baseball Game I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
N 9 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 15
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
Table 2: Baseball Game II 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2x 2  
? ??
 
Figure 1: Movement of the Probability of Winning (Game I) 
 
 
Figure 2: Movement of the Probability of Winning (Game II) 
 
? ??
 A possible mathematical formulation of “excitement” from the viewpoint of the 
neutral audience for one specific “play” or “move” at time t in a match, 
! 
X
t
??is as 
follows: 
 
! 
X
t
=| p
t
" p
t"1 |    ... (1) 
where 
! 
p
t
 is the probability of winning for a team at time t. 
 Thus, the index of the “excitement” of the game, G, is constructed by summing 
! 
X
t
?from the beginning of the game to the end of the game: 
 
! 
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t
" p
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t=1
T
#   ... (2) 
where 
! 
p
t
?is the probability of winning for a team at time t, and T is the time of the end 
of the game.  
 
4. Problems of an Ex Post Index and Advantages of an Ex Ante Index 
 
 According to index G, Game I takes the value of 0.5 and Game II takes the value 
of approximately 1.5. Therefore, index G indicates that Game II should be more 
exciting than Game I. This quantitative result would seem to make intuitive sense, but 
such is not always the case. Consider the following situation that could arise in a 
baseball game: 
  - It is the bottom of the 9th inning. 
 - The score is N 1 – 0 B, and team B is at bat. 
 - Bases are loaded with two outs. 
 Assume the batting average of the hitter at bat to be .250. Further, for simplicity, 
assume that there is no base on balls, and that a single is enough for 2 runs (team B 
? ??
wins). Assume the hitter is then struck out and that the game is then over. Figure 3 
shows the movement of the probability of winning for team B in this situation. 
 
 Figure 3 Movement of the Probability of Winning for Team B 
?
?
? In this situation, the probability of winning for Team B before the play (p0) is 0.25 
since the batting average of the hitter at bat equals the probability of winning for Team 
B. Obviously, the probability of winning for Team B after the play (p1) is 0. Thus, the 
change in the probability of winning is 
! 
X =| 0.25 " 0.00 |= 0.25. 
 Actually, the outcome of the game is difficult to know precisely. Thus, the value 
of X=0.25 seems to be reasonable post game (ex post). This is one of the most exciting 
situations in baseball. X might be 0.75 if the hitter had at least hit a single or more.   
 This analysis shows that the index of “excitement” (G) proposed in the previous 
section is inherently determined post game (ex post). The result is evaluated, not the 
? ??
situation that might lead to higher “excitement”. Index G is thus reasonable for 
measuring the “excitement” of games after they have ended. This has a drawback. If a 
baseball game is like the one above, but with no run at all until the last inning, then the 
value of G for that game becomes quite small relative to a game with many runs. In this 
case, Index G does not seem to make intuitive sense relative to a “feeling” of 
“excitement”. 
 To solve this issue, another index of “excitement” is proposed as follows: 
 
! 
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s
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where 
! 
r
s
?????
! 
r
f
are the probabilities of a successful play and a failed play respectively, 
! 
p
s
?and 
! 
p
f
?are the probabilities of winning after the successful or failed play 
respectively, and 
! 
p
0
?is the probability of winning before the play (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Expected Movement of the Probability of Winning for Team B 
 
? ???
 This index incorporates the expected “excitement” of the situation. By allowing 
multiple outcomes and summing X’, another index of “excitement” for games may be 
constructed as follows:  
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and   
! 
p
t"1 = ri
t
p
t
i
i=1
N
# . 
N is the number of possible outcomes, 
! 
r
t
i?is the probability of the realization of play i 
at time t, and 
! 
p
t
i?is the probability of winning after play i at time t. 
 Call G’ an ex ante index of “excitement” and G an ex post index of “excitement”. 
G’ captures “excitement” before the play while G captures “excitement” after the play. 
 
5. “Excitement” of Games from the Viewpoint of a Rational Player 
 
As stated in 2.2, there are two viewpoints of “excitement” in games. One is the 
“excitement” of games from the viewpoint of a player, and the other is that of an 
audience. The former, the focus of this section, is much more complex than the latter 
but much more important for analyzing the “excitement” of games. Here, the former 
concept is refined step by step to make it fit objective analysis.?
 
 
 
? ???
 
5.1. Fun Factor vs. Game System Factor 
 As discussed in 2.1, there are two major sources of “excitement” in games: the 
“fun factor” and the “game system factor.” Player “excitement” tends to contain more 
of the “fun factor” than audience “excitement” and may be more subjective. In 
constructing an objective index of “excitement” in games from the viewpoint of the 
player, it is crucial to leave out the “fun factor” and consider only the “game system 
factor.”  
 However, this does not mean that the “fun factor” is not important for analyzing 
the “excitement” of games from the viewpoint of the player. The “fun factor” is quite 
important but beyond the scope of analysis using the objective indices developed here. 
 
5.2. Process vs. Result 
Though the “fun factor” may be removed, the concept of “excitement” from the 
viewpoint of the player still poses difficulties. As mentioned in 2.2, player “excitement” 
tends to be strongly influenced by the result of the game. In this paper, Player 
“excitement” emanating from the result of the game (who wins and who loses) is 
excluded from analysis. The result of the game matters as far as it affects the process of 
the game, but there are two reasons to exclude the result of the game from analysis here: 
First, player utility from the result of the game is simply too subjective to be analyzed 
numerically. For some players, the result of the game is almost all the utility they gain 
from it, and the process of the game doesn’t matter at all. For other players, the process 
of the game is quite important, and the results matter very little. This kind of 
subjectivity can be avoided by completely omitting utility from the result of the game. 
? ???
Second, analyses of the result of games are handled quite well by other economic 
theories. Establishing yet another criteria for evaluating the result of games seems 
unnecessary. If the result needs to be evaluated in addition to the process of the game, a 
player utility may be calculated using another theory, multiplied by some weighting 
factor, and added to the “excitement” index developed here.  
 
5.3. Dealing with Player “Effort”  
After excluding the “fun factor” and the utility of the results of games from the 
analysis, there still remains a very important issue related to the “excitement” of the 
game from the viewpoint of the player. Players put much more effort into playing a 
game than the audience. Thus, “excitement” of games from the viewpoint of the player 
might be well analyzed using a “cost-benefit” type of analysis. How to deal with the 
“efforts” put into the game by players is the most crucial point of constructing the 
objective index of the “excitement” of games from the viewpoint of the player. 
An ex-post index of “excitement” of games may be used as the benefit of a game, 
and the sum of the costs that is an increasing function of the “effort” the player puts into 
the game may be subtracted from this index.  
  
! 
I =G " C(e
t
t=1
T
# )   …(5) 
where I is the index of “excitement” from the viewpoint of the player, G is the ex-post 
index of “excitement” of games , C is the cost function, and 
! 
e
t
 is player effort at time 
t. 
 This formulation has a significant problem. G should also be a function of 
! 
e
t
. The 
effort of the player is likely to change the consequence of the game and G as well. If not, 
? ???
the best way to maximize index I is to minimize effort or by putting no effort into the 
game. This does not make intuitive sense. 
   
5.4. Are Player “Efforts” Really “Costs”? 
 A more fundamental question relative to I is whether or not player efforts are 
really costs. In other words, if G is the same for two games, is the game that a player 
puts “less effort” into more exciting for a player than one in which “more effort” is 
exerted? Intuitively, most people would answer “no”. It seems that the amount of effort 
a player puts into a game is an important factor in determining how “exciting” a game 
is. 
 Thus, suppose that the sum of player “efforts” put into a game is itself an index of 
“excitement” of the game from the viewpoint of the player. Thus,  
   
! 
I'= e
t
t=1
T
"    …(6) 
where 
! 
e
t
 is the level of player effort put into the game at time t. 
 
5.5. Optimal “Effort” for A Rational Player 
 Although I’ seems to capture some aspects of the “excitement” of a game, it has 
an inherent deficiency. It is heavily dependent on who the player is. For example, a 
child may put full effort into a game regardless of the process. In this case, I’ has 
nothing to do with the game itself but just shows that the player is “excited.” Thus, a 
typical player who is suitable for objective analysis must be presupposed. 
? ???
 Here, a “rational” player is assumed and measuring the “excitement” of games 
based on his/her “efforts” may proceed. The index of “excitement” of games from the 
viewpoint of a rational player is as follow: 
  
! 
I' '= e
t
*
t=1
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  where 
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t
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! 
e
t
* is the optimum level of effort the player puts into the game at time t, considering the 
utility of gaining the probability of winning and the costs of the effort. 
! 
U(•)  is a utility 
function and 
! 
"U
"p
>0, 
! 
p
t
(•) is the expected probability of winning at time t, which is a 
function of 
! 
e
t
 assumed to be 
! 
"p
"e
# 0. 
! 
e  is the maximum effort the player can put into 
the game. A rational player puts much effort into the game if the level of his/her effort 
affects the difference in the probability of winning before and after that effort. This may 
be translated into his/her utility (Figure 5). Conversely, if the level of his/her effort does 
not have much effect on the probability of winning, the player may put little or no effort 
into the game (Figure 6). The truly exciting game relative to this index is a game in 
which a player who can obtain the best result with minimum effort still voluntarily puts 
forth large effort. 
? ???
 
Figure 5: Optimal Level of Effort When the Play Matters Much 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimal Level of Effort When the Play Matters Little  
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5.6. Optimal “Effort” and the Ex Ante Index of “Excitement” 
 While I’’ seems to be one of the proper indices to measure the “excitement” of 
games from the viewpoint of the player, it has two large deficiencies in the analysis of 
games: First, it is hard to observe player efforts correctly in many cases. Second, the 
index is too complicated to be used in analyzing games without actually playing them 
because 
! 
e
t
* must be calculated for every possible consequence of the game.  
 The solution for this problem is to use the ex ante index of “excitement” proposed 
in previous section as a proxy of I’’. Comparing equations (4) and (7), it can be seen 
that they are quite similar. The following principles may be derived: 
 
a) When 
! 
X '
t
 is low, 
! 
e
t
* is also low because any effort does not change 
! 
p
t
 to 
any significant degree. 
b) When 
! 
X '
t
 is high, 
! 
e
t
*  is also high insofar as higher 
! 
e
t
 increase the 
probability of the realization of plays that will increase the overall probability 
of winning. 
 
Thus, the ex ante index of “excitement” (G’) is a good proxy of an effort-based index of 
the index of “excitement” from the viewpoint of the player (I’’) (insofar as higher 
efforts increase the probability of winning). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 An effort-based index of “excitement” from the viewpoint of a rational player was 
presented in this paper. Further, the ex ante index of “excitement” was shown to be a 
good proxy for this effort-based index. This may have large impact on the development 
? ???
of games and/or rules. Formerly, the development of “exciting” games seemed more an 
art, and it was hard to generalize the process of development. Now, this objective index 
of “excitement” from the viewpoint of the player may be used as a benchmark for 
developing more “exciting” games.  
 As an example, the validity of the following hypothetical principle in developing 
exciting games mathematically can be checked: 
 
The probability of winning at the start of a game should be set to 
! 
1
2
. 
 
 By accumulating valid principles in developing exciting games, a “general theory” 
of game systems may be possible in the future. While it might appear to have relevance 
only to games, this research may well have a large impact on several fields of social 
science, especially the area of welfare economics. Traditionally, welfare economics has 
only considered the utility of goods distributed through some interaction of rational 
individuals. This research shows that the process of interaction among people may have 
utility when considered by itself, and it may be possible to analyze this utility 
mathematically. 
 A zero-sum game may not be zero-sum at all when “excitement” is considered. 
Therefore, the welfare of all people, even in a zero-sum restriction, can be improved by 
improving the game system or “institution.” The process of allocation may sometimes 
be more important than the allocation itself, and the formulations developed in this 
paper may provide the base for exploring such matters. Applications are possible in 
many fields ranging from allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity. 
 
? ???
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